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The Problem of Monopolies  
& Corporate Public Corruption
Zephyr Teachout
Abstract: Defining corruption as the exercise of public power for private, selfish ends, many theorists have 
argued that individuals can be corrupt even if their actions are legal. This essay explores the knotty ques-
tion of when legal corporate action is corrupt. It argues that when corporations exercise public power, 
either through monopolistic control of a market or through campaign contributions and support of gov-
ernmental actors, they are subject to the same responsibilities of anyone who exercises public power. There-
fore, as a theoretical matter, we should call corporations corrupt when they exercise public power selfishly, 
in a way that puts their own interests over the public’s interests. Because they make legal corporate cor-
ruption less likely, global anticorruption campaigns should therefore emphasize antimonopoly laws and 
campaign finance laws. 
Should we call legal corporate political behavior 
corrupt? If so, when?
It is a tricky issue. Of course, in some cases, cor-
porate actors engage in illegal bribes of public offi-
cials, and we can easily label this behavior corrupt.1 
But more frequently, corporate actors use sophisti-
cated legal means to exercise power over public offi-
cials: by making campaign contributions, lobbying, 
exerting media influence, funding nonprofits, spon-
soring think tanks, paying speaking fees, or even cor-
nering the market on key goods and services, creat-
ing public dependencies on the corporation. These 
kinds of behaviors make up what Michael Johnston 
has termed “influence markets,” which he identi-
fies as the primary mode of corruption in developed 
democracies.2 These behaviors are also explored in 
depth in the works of sociologist Amitai Etzioni.3 
All of these behaviors are not only legal in the Unit-
ed States, but are encouraged and taught as essen-
tial strategies in business schools. They also have the 
tendency to spread. Having built their power within 
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the United States or similar legal systems, 
corporations then use legal tools to exert 
influence in other countries. Depending 
on which side of the law they stand on, cor-
porate actors may push to legalize the most 
powerful of their mechanisms of control, 
criminalizing the tools used by weaker so-
cietal agents, or they may exercise their in-
fluence to decriminalize their behaviors 
in a new market. The question is, which of 
these behaviors should we call corrupt, and 
which are merely corrupting?
In 1820 America, it was not illegal for a 
corporation to give money to a member of 
Congress in explicit exchange for that con-
gressperson’s vote. In 2017 America, be-
cause of Citizens United, it is not illegal for a 
corporation to spend millions of dollars to 
punish a congressperson who voted against 
its interests. We can certainly agree that the 
former is corrupt; I think most would ac-
cept that the latter is also corrupt. But if le-
gality is not the line between corrupt and 
noncorrupt corporate political behavior, 
what is? 
I argue that we should use the same test 
for corporations as we do for public offi-
cials, condemning selfish behavior as cor-
rupt when it accompanies the exercise of 
public power, regardless of whether that 
public power derives from formal office- 
holding. Elected officials who exercise pub-
lic power in the service of private ends are 
corrupt irrespective of the legality of their 
behavior. By extension–with understand-
ing that it is not easy to identify what con-
stitutes “public power” or even “selfish be-
havior”–all selfish exercise of public power 
is corrupt. The key theoretical point is this: 
public power, not public office-holding, 
ought to be our marker for determining 
who may be guilty of public corruption. 
Corporate actors are corrupt when they ex-
ercise public power in a way that serves self-
ish ends at the expense of public ends, re-
gardless of whether it is illegal, and regard-
less of whether they formally hold office. 
The descriptive implications of this con-
clusion are substantial: it means that some 
of the great drivers of contemporary cor-
ruption around the world today are large 
multinational corporations engaging in 
legal behavior. The practical implications 
are also substantial, and flow from the im-
proved description: our anticorruption 
strategies must include antimonopoly 
laws, not because antitrust violations are 
themselves corrupt or because mergers are 
themselves corrupt, but because corrup-
tion is more likely when economic power 
is centralized. Failure to name legal corpo-
rate behavior as public corruption in global 
anticorruption campaigns to date has led to 
a focus on passing criminal laws and trans-
parency laws, instead of examining prob-
lems of market structure and monopoliza-
tion with global and domestic impacts. As 
Lord Acton famously put it: “Power tends 
to corrupt.” Power is especially likely to 
corrupt when it is unconstrained by dem-
ocratic accountability. 
This kind of corporate and multina-
tional corruption is a tragedy of design. 
It flows from our failure to protect mar-
kets from concentrated economic power. 
Corporate monopolies are a result of legal 
frameworks that enable excessive concen-
tration of private power, limit the freedom 
to engage in moral action by officers and 
directors, and create overwhelming incen-
tives to bend public power to selfish ends. 
Unlike small companies that have limited 
incentive or capacity to corrupt–because 
they do not exercise public power–multi-
national corporations, at a certain size and 
with enough power, are built to corrupt. 
The critical strategic solution to this de-
sign flaw is to engage antimonopoly laws 
in anticorruption efforts. The antimonop-
oly approach is prophylactic instead of pu-
nitive; in this way it resembles elections, 
another prophylactic anticorruption tool. 
New antitrust enforcement should not seek 
to punish corrupt behavior, but to encour-
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age structures of power that make corrup-
tion less likely. Open markets, free from 
dominant players, are not only important 
for a thriving economy and innovation, 
but for limiting corruption. 
This essay proceeds in two sections. The 
first makes a theoretical argument and 
shows that a surprising formalism per-
vades many approaches to understand-
ing public corruption. This formalism ap-
pears in two ways: First, discussion of pub-
lic power often stops with a formal analysis 
of who holds a particular office, instead of 
who wields power over that office. Second, 
even those anticorruption analysts and ac-
tivists who claim not to tie a definition of 
corruption to legality tend to use legality as 
an important marker in separating the cor-
rupt from the noncorrupt. Building on these 
theoretical points, the second section high-
lights antimonopoly and campaign contri-
bution laws as critical sets of tools for deal-
ing with this crisis of corruption. 
To be clear, I do not make accusations 
about corrupt behavior by particular mod-
ern corporate multinationals. An approach 
of identifying after-the-fact bad actors is al-
ways going to be a weak strategy. Instead, 
I lay out a theoretical framework for en-
abling accusations against modern corrupt 
corporations and a practical road map for 
deterring future corruption via structural 
changes. 
Aristotle laid out six kinds of govern-
ment: three ideal forms and three corrupt 
forms. The rule of one he described as ei-
ther monarchy or tyranny; the rule of a few 
as either an aristocracy or an oligarchy; 
and the rule of the many as either a polity 
or mob rule. The fundamental difference 
between the good and corrupted govern-
ment, according to Aristotle, was the psy-
chological orientation of those who gov-
erned: corrupt governments were selfish; 
ideal governments sought the public good. 
Explaining the difference between a tyr-
anny and a monarchy, he wrote, “the ty-
rant looks to his own advantage, the king 
to that of his subjects.” A tyrant is a king 
who “pursues his own good”; an oligarchy 
is an aristocracy that pursues its own good; 
and mob rule is a publicly governed polity 
whose constituent parts each pursue their 
own selfish interests.4 
This framework, which I have adopted, 
suggests there are two key features of cor-
ruption: the exercise of governing power 
and selfish intent. The implication of this 
framework is that private actors engage in 
public corruption when they wield govern-
ing power selfishly. 
Within the anticorruption field, there are 
those who describe corruption in terms of 
the violation of formal roles and obliga-
tions, and those who see corruption in 
terms of the illegitimate pursuit of private 
interest at the expense of the public inter-
est.5 The former ties itself in knots of posi-
tivism. As political scientist Richard Mul-
gan has recently argued: 
By taking existing duties and rules as given, 
such definitions are too closely tied to a par-
ticular institutional context. They do not pro-
vide an external standard by which to assess 
whether the duties or rules themselves prohib-
it actions that should be regarded as corrupt.6
All parties appear to agree that public 
power is an important feature of public 
corruption, though this has been given 
short shrift in some of the literature.7 For 
instance, a recent article appearing in the 
UCLA Law Review observes that most defi-
nitions of corruption involve the abuse 
of public office for private gain. The arti-
cle continues: “The term ‘public office’ is 
relatively clear. It includes, among others, 
those persons whom the electorate has en-
trusted with power to advance the public 
interest.”8 Accompanying this assertion is 
a link to a judicial decision about the scope 
of a bribery statute, making the easy error 
of conflating statutory law and definitions 
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of corruption in one area but not in anoth-
er. If one does not confine oneself to stat-
utes, it is not at all clear that office, instead 
of power, is the key question.9 
For much of industrial history, private 
parties were viewed as corrupt when 
they exercised public power, regardless 
of whether they held office.10 In the 1874 
case Trist v. Child, an old man hired a lob-
byist to help collect a debt from Congress. 
After the lobbyist succeeded, the old man 
refused to pay him; in response, the lob-
byist sued the man for money owed. The 
case came before the Supreme Court, 
which had to decide whether contracts 
to lobby were legitimate and enforceable 
in court. The Court concluded that they 
were not, writing that “If any of the great 
corporations of the country were to hire 
adventurers who make market of them-
selves in this way [for] the promotion of 
their private interests, the moral sense of 
every right-minded man would instinc-
tively denounce the employer and employed 
as steeped in corruption.”11 The Court’s 
language indicates that corporations could 
themselves be corrupt, not merely a means 
by which public entities are corrupted. 
But over the last forty years of anticor-
ruption efforts, many academics and jour-
nalists have treated private companies as 
corrupt only when engaged in what is 
sometimes called “private corruption”: 
namely, accepting internal bribes or kick-
backs.12 Much of the discussion about pri-
vate entities–big multinational companies 
like Monsanto, Google, or Siemens–con-
cerns whether we should recognize a cate-
gory of private-to-private corruption.13 To 
address these concerns, some definitions of 
corruption focus on “entrusted power” in-
stead of public power. Transparency Inter-
national, for instance, defines corruption 
as “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain,” in order to include private-to-private 
relationships within the definition. But 
Transparency International does not have 
a clear scope of what constitutes entrusted 
power for purposes of public corruption, 
nor does it examine whether multination-
al corporations can be seen as having “en-
trusted power” because of their enabling 
statutes. Alternatively, private companies 
are seen as corrupting when they induce 
behavior on the part of elected officials, or 
perhaps when they break existing anticor-
ruption laws. They are not treated as cor-
rupt for their use of legal mechanisms, even 
when that use is for self-serving ends. 
Some modern definitions openly rely on 
public office, instead of public power, as a 
central feature of corruption. Political sci-
entist Joseph Nye’s influential definition 
of corruption begins with a claim about 
the centrality of formal roles, arguing that 
corruption is either rule violation or “be-
havior which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private- 
regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) pecuniary or state gains.”14 Several 
other scholars have placed public office at 
the center of the definition, but even those 
who do not privilege the phrase “public 
office” or “formal duties” often implicit-
ly limit the accusation of public corrup-
tion to those with formal public power.15 
How should we approach this question? 
It is perhaps easiest to divide the possible 
approaches into a formal approach and a 
functional approach. The formal approach 
limits the accusation of public corruption 
to those who hold an official position. 
The functional approach looks at whether 
public power is exercised, regardless of 
office-holding. 
A formal approach leads to peculiar re-
sults. Imagine a rich business owner in a 
small town. He consciously chooses to use 
his wealth to elect a town council and may-
or that will serve his interest and lower his 
taxes. He is shameless about his desires: 
he readily announces that he is only in-
terested in himself, and will use whatever 
means he can to serve himself. A formal 
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approach would treat the business owner 
as not corrupt because he is not an elect-
ed official. It would not ask how he uses 
his wealth, whether in fact he has public 
power, or whether he is being selfish. In-
stead, it looks merely at his status: since he 
was neither appointed nor elected, it treats 
him as someone who might be involved in 
private corruption (accepting bribes in his 
business) or someone who might lead to 
the corruption of public officers, but not 
someone who might be corrupt in his own 
right. 
On the other hand, a functional analysis 
would treat this business owner as engaged 
in public corruption because he is using 
public power, and using it to serve private 
ends without regard to the public good. 
That he may also be corrupting the local 
government is a secondary question. This 
business owner is not unlike Aristotle’s 
king (or oligarch), who chooses to rule 
over others in a way that benefits himself. 
That he uses the mechanisms of democra-
cy does not change the fundamental com-
bination of his ruling others and his moral 
orientation.16 
Another thought experiment in formal-
ism also leads to the mangling of language. 
Imagine a king who has inherited absolute 
power over his country. He is selfish and 
cares only for his own interests, not the in-
terests of the public. Because he is worried 
about revolt, he chooses to install an elect-
ed government, but creates laws allowing 
for only one party on the ballot, and estab-
lishes informal mechanisms that ensure 
that he is the only person who can select 
who runs for office. He then officially steps 
down from his position and abolishes the 
monarchy. But there is no doubt that he 
controls who gets “elected” and what de-
cisions they make in office. A formal ap-
proach would say that only those elected 
officials can be guilty of public corruption. 
A functional approach would consider the 
actual power dynamics, not the form. 
As these examples show, a functional 
analysis is the more natural approach: for-
malism seems to simplify the concept, but 
adds a requirement to public power of pub-
lic office-holding that is hard to justify. Rul-
ing is what creates moral obligations, re-
gardless of how that rule is exercised. The 
strongest argument against the formal ap-
proach is that there is no a priori reason to 
limit the scope of public corruption to those 
holding elected, appointed, or inherited of-
fice. The selfish interests in a corrupt gov-
ernment might be the interests of the people 
holding formal power in the government, 
but–critically–they can also be the private 
interests of someone or something that ex-
ercises informal power over the official gov-
ernment from outside it.
The best defense of a formal approach is 
that it is more administrable and renders 
corruption easier to measure. But we should 
not confuse the administrability of crimi-
nal and civil laws with the correct definition 
of a nonlegal term like corruption, just as 
we should not refuse to call something cor-
rupt because it is difficult to measure. The 
functional approach would be inappropri-
ate for defining criminal laws of corruption; 
it would require a fact-finder to make deter-
minations of influence and power in a po-
litical society, beyond a reasonable doubt.17 
But we are not rewriting legal definitions, 
and inadequacy in criminal law does not 
make the functional approach inadequate 
in our efforts to locate corruption. 
Another possible objection to the func-
tional approach might be that it seems 
harsh: it subjects private actors who have 
never run for public office or sought to be 
appointed to public office to accusations 
of public corruption and obligations to the 
public good that they never wanted. But on 
the individual level, this problem does not 
exist. Individuals are not required to ex-
ercise public power, even when they have 
the capacity to do so. And most ceos of 
most companies, like individuals, simply 
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have no capacity to exercise public power. 
They are free to suggest ideas, set up meet-
ings, and occasionally lobby officials, but 
no one would argue that in so doing they 
are exercising public power. Success in pri-
vate business creates no obligation to en-
gage in the public sphere in a selfish way. 
Moreover, inasmuch as those with inher-
ited public power never chose their posi-
tion, we do not soften the blow of corrup-
tion accusations by arguing that kings can-
not be guilty of misusing powers they did 
not seek. They may always abdicate. How-
ever, for corporate officers and directors 
of enormous companies that can exercise 
governing power, this harshness does ex-
pose a fundamental problem with our cur-
rent antimonopoly laws by creating two 
obligations that conflict with each other. 
Using the functionalist approach, we 
should shift from an analysis of office-hold-
ing to an analysis of who holds “govern-
ing power.” Governing power exists when 
a company, person, or institution has the 
capacity to make choices that govern the 
lives of others. A juror has governing pow-
er over the defendant. A magnate has gov-
erning power over his town when he uses 
his ability to elect or defeat candidates who 
then exercise formal power. Governance is 
often defined by reference to a combination 
of decision-making and the implementa-
tion of those decisions. Political scientist 
Stephen Bell’s popular definition of gover-
nance argues that it is “the use of institu-
tions, structures of authority and even col-
laboration to allocate resources and coor-
dinate or control activity in society or the 
economy.”18 The lines are by no means 
clear; and there is not space here to explore 
in full the difficult questions of what is and 
is not governing power.
More important, the job of anticorrup-
tion activists is largely not to identify in-
stances of normative failure, but to iden-
tify the syndrome, and then push for the 
rules that make the syndrome less likely. 
We need not spend much time debating 
the particulars of who or what company 
is corrupt, so long as we agree that there 
is a broad set of powerful companies that 
pursue selfish interests while exercising 
public power.
By way of analogy, consider a national 
campaign against alcoholism. One way to 
deal with alcoholism is to try to identify 
everyone who is alcoholic–engaging in 
extensive studies to determine who might 
be dependent on alcohol and who is mere-
ly drinking a lot–in order to provide in-
dividualized resources to those who need 
them. In that approach, the question of 
who makes the judgment about particular 
individuals, and by what criteria they are 
judged, is critical. But another approach 
might be to use countrywide surveys to 
identify that there is problem of alcohol-
ism, and then suggest countrywide solu-
tions that would reduce the levels of addic-
tion overall and the likelihood of future ad-
diction. In the second approach, we spend 
little energy parsing the alcoholic from the 
nonalcoholic, and most of our energy is fo-
cused on prophylactic rules.19
Using this syndrome approach, undoubt-
edly there are several big multinationals 
engaged in public corruption. We need not 
have a consensus around individual actors’ 
corruption in order to agree that there is 
endemic corruption. Two analysts might 
disagree over whether Siemens or Ama-
zon has more governing power, but they 
can certainly agree that some large multi-
national corporations engage in the self-
ish use of public power, and would likely 
include both Amazon and Siemens in that 
category. 
For instance, I can argue that Google’s 
exercise of public power is corrupt be-
cause it does so in pursuit of its own self-
ish ends, regardless of the impact on the 
public good. As evidence to support my ar-
gument, I could point out that, as of 2017, 
Google is the largest lobbyist in the Unit-
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ed States. Google has been implementing 
a successful political strategy to embed its 
software in public schools (both in order 
to get its tools adopted and in order to col-
lect data).20 Google is a major funder of 
think tanks and has exercised its funding 
power to shape policy, supporting schol-
ars who support its own political ends. In 
short, an essential, nonaccidental part of 
Google’s business strategy is to shape pub-
lic policy in a way that serves its own nar-
row interests. As with the rich business-
man controlling the small town described 
above, I argue that a functional analysis 
would treat Google as corrupt. Howev-
er, one need not agree with my particular 
argument about Google in order to agree 
that the structure of power in our society 
makes it likely that powerful companies 
like Google–if not Google itself–will use 
public power for private ends. 
The legality of the behavior is not deci-
sive in determining either whether there 
is governing power or whether it is self-
ish. Google’s practices as described here 
are entirely legal under U.S. law. Lobbying 
is legal, funding think tanks is legal, build-
ing a political strategy to shape public edu-
cation is legal, and supporting academics 
is legal. Moreover, these behaviors should 
be legal. However, the legality or illegali-
ty of a behavior is not a particularly useful 
distinction in determining whether some-
thing is corrupt. As political scientist Den-
nis Thompson has argued, “Connections 
that are proximate and explicit, elements 
required to show bribery, are not neces-
sarily any more corrupt than connections 
that are indirect and implicit. The former 
may be more detectable, but are not nec-
essarily the more deliberate or damaging 
form of corruption.”21
Instead, there are many possible relation-
ships between the legality of a behavior and 
its corruptness. First, it is possible that there 
is no relationship between illegality and 
corruption. The second possibility is that il-
legality separates corrupt from noncorrupt 
behavior. The third possibility is that ille-
gal activity defines the heart of corruption, 
that which is easiest to define and which we 
should most readily condemn, but some le-
gal activity is also corrupt, if less intense-
ly so. The fourth possibility is that there is 
often a relationship between illegality and 
corruption, but that such correlation does 
not help us decide in any particular instance 
whether an action is corrupt or not. Corrup-
tion encompasses a great deal of legal be-
havior; only a small subset of corrupt be-
havior has been criminalized. Moreover, 
noncorrupt behavior can be criminalized 
and called “corrupt” by the state. 
The final option–a correlative relation-
ship but not sufficiently strong to make 
presumptions–is the best way to under-
stand the connection between corruption 
and legality. While the overlap between 
illegality and corruption exists, and may 
not be wholly arbitrary, it approaches arbi-
trariness because the reasons for not crim-
inalizing behavior are so varied and histor-
ically and culturally dependent. Unless one 
is a positivist (believing law defines moral-
ity), there is no a priori reason to assume 
a strong relationship between that which 
has been criminalized and that which is 
corrupt. In fact, given that power tends to 
protect itself, in most polities we should 
often start with the assumption that the 
most corrupt acts are shielded from crim-
inal liability by those in power. Those in 
power, be they judges or lawmakers, may 
have selfish reasons to protect corrupt be-
havior and criminalize noncorrupt behav-
ior. World history is littered with regimes 
that do not criminalize corrupt behavior 
because those in power are engaged in it. 
But even in a perfectly functioning democ-
racy, where an engaged public would have 
criminalized corrupt behavior, there are 
many reasons for using other tools than 
criminal law to deter corruption. 
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The reasons for criminalizing some be-
havior and not others is often unrelated to 
the morality of the action or the degree of 
public condemnation. A democratic society 
could decide that criminal law is not a par-
ticularly effective mechanism for deterring 
corruption. In the United States, bribery of 
members of Congress was not illegal at the 
federal level until 1853. Before then, every-
one thought that paying a congressperson 
in exchange for changing a vote was cor-
rupt; they simply did not use criminal law 
as the tool for deterring such corruption. 
Other considerations, like the desire to pro-
tect certain forms of expression, could lead 
to the legalization of corrupt behavior. For 
instance, under existing U.S. law, a senator 
who accepts a personal gift of $15 with the 
understanding that it will influence his or 
her vote is committing federal bribery. No 
explicit exchange is needed. However, if 
the same senator accepts a campaign con-
tribution of $5,000, knowing it represents 
the purchase of the exercise of one hundred 
votes, that does not violate federal bribery 
law in the absence of an explicit contract or 
agreement indicating the senator’s intent.22 
There are reasons, both historical and pro-
tective of political expression, that make 
the former a crime and the latter not. But 
those reasons tell us nothing about the cor-
ruptness of the action. The fact that the lat-
ter is not a crime is not evidence that it is not 
corrupt, or that it is somehow less corrupt. 
As of 2016, it is legal under federal law in 
the United States for someone to pay tens 
of thousands of dollars to a state governor 
in exchange for the governor, using the 
official title of the office, setting up meet-
ings and making introductions to other 
officials and business executives. The Su-
preme Court struck down a law criminal-
izing this behavior because of free speech 
and due process concerns. Nothing in the 
decision suggested that the Court thought 
that the behavior was not corrupt.23 In the 
same vein, lobbying, which was criminal 
behavior for one-third of American history, 
has achieved protected legal status because 
laws against lobbying were struck down as 
violative of the First Amendment.24 This 
is undoubtedly a good thing. But the fact 
that criminalizing a behavior would threat-
en free speech is hardly sufficient to mean 
that no instances of that behavior are exhi-
bitions of corruption. 
In sum, criminality and corruption may 
have a substantial overlap in certain devel-
oped democracies, but that overlap does 
not tell us much about the corruptness of 
any particular act, or whether most cor-
rupt acts are crimes.
You might argue that I have created a 
straw man. It is the rare definition of cor-
ruption that openly relies on criminal law 
as a starting point for determining whether 
corruption exists. Definitions are far more 
likely to refer to “abuse of public power 
for private ends,” or “norm violation in a 
self-serving way by those in public power.” 
Even Joseph Nye, whose definition is often 
characterized as requiring illegality, recog-
nizes norm violation, apart from illegality, 
within the category of corruption. Howev-
er, among the scholars and commentators 
who theoretically acknowledge that much 
corrupt behavior is legal, many still ex-
hibit an assumption that legality is a good 
marker of corruption. Empirical studies 
and economic models of corruption often 
start with criminality.25 Transparency In-
ternational starts with the assumption that 
most corruption is illegal.26 Many compar-
ative studies rely on criminality directly or 
indirectly. 
For instance, in Susan Rose-Ackerman’s 
landmark book Corruption and Government: 
Causes, Consequences, and Reform, she ac-
knowledges that legal corruption is im-
portant, but states that because her work 
is comparative, she will only look at those 
instances in which laws were broken.27 She 
further argues that it “may be rhetorically 
valuable” to call legal behavior corruption, 
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but that it does not “further the analytical” 
or “policy exercise of understanding the 
landscape and proposing reforms.”28 This 
seems to get the analytical and policy proj-
ect upside down: it privileges those with 
the power to make the law with the power 
to define corruption.29 Rose-Ackerman’s 
recent work has been more likely to recog-
nize legal behavior as a significant problem, 
but I use this example because it is typical 
of the simultaneous acceptance and rejec-
tion of legal corruption.30 
Once the anticorruption community ac-
cepts that neither office-holding nor legal-
ity is a definitive marker of the existence 
of public corruption, it becomes free to 
explore corruption as it actually exists in 
modern society.
In the last thirty years, the entire machin-
ery of modern multinational corporations 
has developed, through law and culture, to 
embrace the pursuit of public power as an 
essential business function. The deep de-
sign of a large multinational corporation 
is to build power to gain control over lo-
cal governments and international regimes 
in which it operates so that it can advance 
policies that create value for the corpora-
tion.31 Large multinational corporations 
routinely exercise public power, and do so 
guided by private interests above public 
ones. The intent/orientation of large cor-
porations is easier to divine than the in-
tent of most individuals or organizations. 
When there is a conflict between public 
and private interests, the enabling statutes 
of a corporation require an orientation to-
ward a limited set of stakeholders. 
One might point out that corporate en-
tities need not seek short-term profits. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaf-
firmed: “Modern corporate law does not 
require for-profit corporations to pursue 
profit at the expense of everything else, 
and many do not.”32 The myth that cor-
porations are required to maximize share-
holder value is just that: a myth, and one 
that is largely pushed by activist hedge 
fund managers seeking to pressure cor-
porations to produce short-term profits.33 
However, corporations are not free to pur-
sue the public good when doing so conflicts 
with the long-term sustainability of the cor-
poration. Under state law, directors and of-
ficers of a corporation have a duty of care 
and of loyalty to the corporation. That duty 
does not flow merely to shareholders, but 
to all the stakeholders in a corporation. At a 
basic, ethical level, these laws create an ob-
ligation to maximize value–arguably long-
term, sustainable value–for the corpora-
tion. It is rare that a lawsuit succeeds on the 
grounds that directors and officers violated 
these obligations, but that does not mean 
that the obligation does not exist. Instead, 
the laws, designed to ensure that directors 
and officers do not treat the corporation as 
their own vehicle, also ensure that the pub-
lic good cannot justify decisions that direct-
ly hurt stakeholders. 
In many instances, corporate stakeholder 
ends will either support the public interest 
or at least be consistent with the public in-
terest. In these instances, there is no corrup-
tion problem. Under other circumstances, a 
ceo may have some discretion due to con-
flicting visions of long-term sustainability: 
this discretionary space is where corporate 
social responsibility (csr; a form of corpo-
rate self-regulation) is likely to be most pow-
erful. In the overwhelming majority of oth-
er instances, the corporation will not exer-
cise public power. In these cases also, there is 
no corruption problem. For the millions of 
small or medium-sized corporations, their 
private obligations will not conflict with 
public obligations, because such corpora-
tions simply do not have the power to shape 
public policy on taxes, trade, antimonopo-
ly, or contracting: they will face no moral 
dilemma. The local pizza shop has no raft 
of lobbyists, and if the owner makes a po-
litical donation, it will be $30 or $300, not 
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a $300,000 independent expenditure. The 
vast majority of companies never engage a 
lobbying firm, let alone build all the tenta-
cles of public-policy-bending machinery. 
Some company owners may be wonder-
ful and deeply invested in their communi-
ty, others greedy and self-centered, but as a 
structural matter, these companies do not 
pose a public corruption threat. 
However, for large corporations that in-
vest heavily in politics, there will be fre-
quent episodes in which the obligations 
to long-term profitability and to the public 
interest directly conflict. Four of the most 
common conflicts involve tax laws, trade 
laws, antimonopoly laws, and contracts 
with the government. Big corporations will 
almost always have an interest in lowering 
their tax burden, improving their position 
in global trade, decreasing antimonopoly 
enforcement, and increasing opportunities 
to win government contracts. Occasional-
ly these interests will align with those of 
the public, but frequently they will not. It 
is indefensible–to all the stakeholders in 
the corporation–not to be engaged in pol-
itics and not to build public power that can 
be used to benefit the corporation in terms 
of taxes, trade, antimonopoly, and govern-
ment contracts. A ceo of Apple that did not 
have a public relations firm would be fired 
by its board of directors. 
Imagine a ceo of a modern multination-
al corporation with $100 million to invest. 
She can choose to invest the money in de-
creasing the cost of producing the product, 
or she can invest the money in changing the 
laws to decrease the corporate tax rate. The 
first involves changing the production line, 
switching some materials, and a slight prod-
uct innovation; the second involves a com-
bination of campaign contributions, direct 
lobbying, media strategy, and coauthored 
white papers. Most estimates suggest the 
first strategy provides a 5 percent return 
on investment, while the second strategy 
provides a 50 percent return on investment. 
The first strategy does not hurt the public at 
large; the second strategy decreases essen-
tial tax revenue for schools. The first strate-
gy involves no corruption. The second strat-
egy is corrupt. We would expect the ceo to 
engage in the second strategy. The selfish 
exercise of public power–public corrup-
tion–is an essential part of the job. 
How can we change that behavior? How 
can we fight the threat of rampant legal 
public corruption by large multinationals? 
Some analysts, like Ben Heinemann Jr., 
argue that the discretion afforded direc-
tors and officers is far greater than that 
which they exercise, and that corporate 
leaders can, consistent with law and cul-
ture, pursue the public good. Heinemann’s 
efforts are important, but cannot address 
the problem posed by a corporation like 
Apple that wants to reduce its tax burden 
through lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions. Some might argue for a fundamental 
overhaul in corporate law, explicitly requir-
ing officers and directors to serve the pub-
lic good. And the rise of new corporations 
operating with clear public obligations 
might create positive impacts at the mar-
gins, but the side effects of fundamentally 
restructuring the corporate form would be 
far from benign. Moreover, this argument 
is antidemocratic, and essentially an argu-
ment for aristocratic/oligarchic rule: it ac-
cepts that multinationals play a governing 
role, and merely requests that they do so 
with a public orientation. 
Instead, our anticorruption efforts should 
focus on the precise point at which pub-
lic corruption comes into play: when cor-
porations come to exercise public power. 
Corporate public corruption is most like-
ly when the industry itself is very large and 
heavily concentrated; when there are cross- 
industry interests in bending public power; 
or when a single corporation has become 
essential to a polity, or “too big to fail.”
In other words, we should focus public 
policy on the problem of corporations ex-
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ercising public power–which only hap-
pens at a certain scale and degree of power 
 –and not the problems of corporations be-
ing selfish: let them be selfish, but do not 
let them govern. 
In the United States, there is a long tra-
dition of resisting the corrupting tenden-
cies of concentrated power through anti-
monopoly laws. These laws–at the center 
of which is the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890–were not designed to punish corrupt 
behavior, but to make corruption less like-
ly. They were designed to prevent corpo-
rate directors and officers from facing the 
point at which their public and corporate 
obligations clashed. They were designed to 
ensure that private parties did not gain un-
accountable public power. As Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas explained in his dissent in 
the 1948 Supreme Court case U.S. v. Colum-
bia Steel Co., the traditional philosophy of 
American antitrust law is that 
all power tends to develop into a government 
in itself. Power that controls the economy 
. . . should be scattered into many hands so 
that the fortunes of the people will not be 
dependent on the whim or caprice, the po-
litical prejudices, the emotional stability of 
a few self-appointed men.
Drawing on that tradition, we should em-
brace antimonopoly law as an essential tool 
for fighting local and global corruption. 
The first target might be highly concen-
trated industries. Profits are higher in con-
centrated industries, creating more cash 
flow for investment in politics. (It is no acci-
dent that pharmaceuticals, an industry that 
explicitly relies on monopolies, has among 
the highest profits and the greatest polit-
ical investments.) Moreover, it is simpler 
and cheaper to organize a group consensus 
when the potential members are few. Few-
er actors can more easily make joint strate-
gic decisions about what to demand from 
government and create a shared, consis-
tent message when lobbying and in meet-
ings. With fewer actors, the costs of identi-
fying shared needs, of coordinating timing, 
and of identifying and punishing free-riders 
are all reduced. In monopolistic or oligop-
olistic industries, it is easier to share fixed 
costs, like writing legislation, identifying 
targeted politicians, and producing effec-
tive messaging. The concentrated industry 
therefore can more economically lobby for 
shared goals, including decreasing taxes for 
the industry, increasing subsidies for the in-
dustry, decreasing regulations, and creat-
ing public insurance for the industry. An es-
sential part of our anticorruption strategy, 
then, must be decreasing concentration. 
That means looking at industries that are 
dominated by few firms, such as online ad-
vertising or online retail. 
Anticorruption reformers should also 
focus on corporations that have grown so 
large that they represent a significant frac-
tion of the economy. When the size of a cor-
poration relative to the gdp is significant–
like 2 percent of gdp–democratic choic-
es become constrained by the self-interest 
of the individual corporation. Even in the 
absence of resources devoted to purchas-
ing political influence, the company with 
a large relative size will have public pow-
er. Its sheer size makes it incumbent upon 
legislators to design laws that will at mini-
mum ensure the stability of the company. 
If Lockheed goes under and lays off all of its 
employees, that has an impact on the entire 
economy. Even without lobbying, there-
fore, Lockheed can make demands of gov-
ernment based on the threat of its own fail-
ure. Companies that are large relative to the 
size of a country’s gdp can control politics 
by threatening to collapse or leave if their 
demands are not met. 
In concrete terms, global anticorrup-
tion should support free and open mar-
kets, with decentralized economic actors. 
We should support antitrust efforts that 
put barriers in the way of companies’ mo-
nopolistic behavior, such as the European 
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Union’s efforts against Google; support 
antitrust regimes that lead to breaking up 
heavily concentrated industries and stop-
ping mergers; and support campaign fi-
nance regimes that make corporate influ-
ence on elections more difficult. The goal 
is to encourage an approach toward pow-
er that recalls Justice Louis Brandeis: con-
centrated private power is corrupt and cor-
rupts, and therefore should not be allowed. 
The most useful antimonopoly, anticor-
ruption strategies will differ in particular 
contexts; but as the exercise of power by 
multinationals continues to grow, there 
are a handful of urgent approaches:
· Applying neutrality principles to plat-
forms like Google and Facebook, and 
not allowing vertical integration: search 
services and advertising must be broken 
up. Amazon and Apple must be limited 
in their ability to discriminate in price or 
search, and to use pay-to-play models in 
their search. The massive public power 
and control wielded by these platforms 
depend on their ability to leverage their 
power in one area to make profits in an-
other. This approach includes condemn-
ing countries that refuse to limit platform 
dominance and power. 
· Supporting legal regimes that separate 
distribution from content in cable and 
wireless companies, requiring the break-
up of Comcast, for instance. Condemning 
countries that refuse to separate the two. 
· Urging countries to break up big banks, 
both in terms of size and function.
· Supporting the breakup of the monop-
olies of companies like Monsanto, al-
lowing for competition from farmers; 
opposing the Monsanto-Bayer merger; 
supporting countries that ban the own-
ership of seeds and chemicals. 
· Encouraging global trade agreements to 
disfavor monopolistic practices.
· Condemning countries that allow cor-
porate spending in elections.
None of these principles is simple to 
implement. There will necessarily be a 
high degree of over- and under-inclusive-
ness in any rule. There is no magic num-
ber representing company size within a 
country, or across countries, and no mag-
ic structural relationship that will avoid 
these harms. This, of course, is true for 
most laws: even for something seeming-
ly more straightforward like traffic law, 
there is no magic number at which the 
speed limit best accommodates the prin-
ciple of reducing unnecessary deaths. But 
when it comes to governance and rules of 
governance, there is always special dif-
ficulty in defining the rules of the game, 
because the rules of engagement create 
the outcome, including the outcome of 
what the rules of engagement should be. 
However, the difficulty in designing rules 
should not be a deterrence to trying. The 
underlying argument here is similar to 
that of the mid-twentieth-century Chi-
cago school of economics. Our visions of 
human nature differ: I believe people are 
complicated and can be public-orientated, 
that we are not solely or even primarily 
homo economicus. And we use different lan-
guage. But these economists from Chicago 
saw the threat of corruption of large corpo-
rations wielding public power. They were 
worried about a future of “rent-seeking,” 
as they called it, shifting public policy as 
a strategy for increasing profits. In “The 
Theory of Economic Regulation,” George 
Stigler famously wrote that “regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed 
and operated primarily for its benefit.”34
Stigler, Gary Becker, Richard Posner, and 
others argued that the size of government 
should shrink to prevent corruption, be-
cause a smaller government with weaker 
central governing powers would create less 
incentive for private actors to seek pub-
lic power. They argued that rent-seeking 
would be more likely in highly regulated 
industries because the existence of regu-
147 (3)  Summer 2018 123
Zephyr 
Teachout
lation and differentiation is what inspired 
corporate political involvement. 
However, they did not push for an ag-
gressive antimonopoly strategy. Instead, 
they pushed to dismantle antimonopoly 
laws. Why? They made two basic theoret-
ical mistakes in their description of politics. 
First, they imagined a limited set of policies 
that might affect a company and, second, 
they presumed an upper limit of the val-
ue that companies could extract from gov-
ernments. Judge Posner argued that once 
a company becomes a monopolist, it has 
“less incentive to expend resources on ob-
taining the aid of government in fending off 
competitors” than one in a highly compet-
itive industry.35 Posner imagines that the 
would-be monopolist faces a single rent 
(monopoly) that, once secured, sates his in-
terest, and operates as a ceiling of all possi-
ble rents. This is clearly false: experience 
shows that big companies, having invested 
in securing a foothold in power, will have al-
ready paid much of the fixed cost of build-
ing the machinery to exercise public pow-
er, and will be more imaginative (and effi-
cient) in using it to secure more benefits of 
different kinds. This logical flaw also shows 
up in the work of Gary Becker. In his classic 
1983 paper modeling rent-seeking, Becker 
describes an upper limit on what a compa-
ny will seek from the government: “The 
total amount raised from taxes, including 
hidden taxes like inflation, equals the total 
amount available for subsidies, including 
hidden subsidies like restrictions on entry 
into an industry.”36 However, the creative 
rent-seeker, like the entrepreneur in any 
area, will not look at present flows to deter-
mine potential flows, but will look at possi-
ble flows given political limitations. There 
is no theoretical constraint on the poten-
tial size of the subsidy. The potential value 
of the subsidy is not defined by existing 
taxes. More taxes can be levied: the exist-
ing population of the country does not de-
fine it, because levies (direct and indirect) 
can be brought to bear on other countries’ 
populations. As a theoretical matter, then, 
the upper limit of a subsidy from a govern-
ment is the maximum revenue the gov-
ernment can generate through its power. 
(As a practical matter, the probabilities ap-
proach zero as the subsidy approaches the 
maximum revenue.) This is not a small 
point. There are plenty of real-world ex-
amples in which companies exercise pub-
lic power to secure benefits despite the ab-
sence of existing revenue. The bailout of the 
financial institutions is one example; the in-
surance mandate sought by insurance com-
panies is another. And at a smaller scale, 
laws that require schools to teach technol-
ogy classes are, from the perspectives of cer-
tain technology companies, rent-seeking 
laws: they are not grounded in existing 
revenue but rely on school boards to cre-
ate it. Deficit spending is not limited by cur-
rent tax revenues. And one can seek rents 
through the manipulation of monetary pol-
icy in a way that is not limited by existing 
revenues. In other words, the total poten-
tial benefits are bounded by the total po-
tential (not actual) governmental reve-
nue, including debts. The fixed upper lim-
it model was essential to the argument that 
that concentration in industries posed no 
corruption threat.
Anticorruption crusaders have for decades 
asked companies to join them in fighting 
corruption on a global level. Some of these 
efforts have doubtlessly produced public 
good. However, corporate social responsibil-
ity is bound to be insufficient to address the 
threat of corruption that flows from those 
companies themselves. Even the most ag-
gressive corporate social responsibility stan-
dards do not exhort companies unilaterally 
to become less politically powerful. Even if 
they did, it is unlikely that such an exhorta-
tion would work: it is hard to imagine Mic-
rosoft choosing not to merge with LinkedIn 
because of internal csr policies. 
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Corporate public corruption flows from a 
tragic tension: between directors’ or offi-
cers’ obligation to the corporation’s health, 
and their ability to increase profitability by 
increasing corporate power. There is ample 
evidence that massive corporations, even 
those perceived as leaders in csr, invest 
heavily in public relations to reduce their 
tax burden. They do not bribe, but they 
extract wealth from the public through tax 
cuts; on a net level, they add more corrup-
tion than they reduce. 
One approach locates the institutional 
flaw in corporate law and corporate obli-
gations, arguing that officers and directors 
should be ethically free to pursue the pub-
lic good even when it directly conflicts with 
corporate goals. In the Aristotelian frame-
work, one might call this the aristocratic ap-
proach: the goal is to free corporate ceos to 
be aristocrats instead of oligarchs. While I 
laud these efforts, I am troubled by the vi-
sion they present: unaccountable corporate 
actors independently choosing that which 
is best for the country, and quite possibly 
the world. Moreover, systems of aristocracy 
are notoriously weak, and tend toward cor-
ruption themselves. Freedom plus exhorta-
tion does not always mean virtue. The oc-
casional multinational will resist the temp-
tation to reduce its own taxes or deregulate 
its industry, but that is hardly a prospect to 
rely on. As Madison famously wrote in Fed-
eralist Paper No. 51: “If angels were to gov-
ern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary.” 
The problem is not with the existence 
of the corporation, or with corporate law. 
More free and open markets would lead to 
less corruption. The problem is with con-
centrated power: a handful of actors who 
are sui generis; so large and powerful they 
can bend public power. The modern anti-
corruption movement chooses not to ad-
dress these large actors, using formalism 
or legalism as an excuse, at all of our peril. 
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